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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-1488 
_____________ 
 
CATHY C. CARDILLO, 
    Appellant  
 
v. 
 
MARK NEARY,  In his Personal Capacity as Clerk of the Supreme Court of New Jersey; 
BONNIE C. FROST,  In her Personal Capacity as Chair of the Disciplinary Review 
Board; CHARLES CENTINARO, In his Personal Capacity as Director of the Office of 
Attorney Ethics; MARVIN WALDEN, JR., Esq., In his Personal Capacity as Secretary of 
the District IV Fee Arbitration Committee; AURELIO VINCITORI, In his Personal 
Capacity as Fee Arbitrator of the District IV Fee Arbitration Committee; MEGAN 
BURNS 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-16-cv-02347) 
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 11, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before:  JORDAN, VANASKIE, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 28, 2018) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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______________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
  
 Cathy Cardillo appeals the District Court’s order dismissing for her civil rights 
action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The District Court sua sponte applied the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and determined that jurisdiction over her claim was lacking.  
See generally Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).  On appeal, Cardillo argues that her 
constitutional claims were never properly before the state court.  As a result, she contends 
that the District Court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was incorrect.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s order.  
I. 
 Cardillo practiced law in New Jersey for a number of years before retiring and 
moving to Portugal.  After her retirement and relocation, a former client, Megan Burns, 
submitted a claim with New Jersey’s District VI Fee Arbitration Committee (the 
“Committee”), contesting Cardillo’s fee for past representation.  The Committee 
attempted to serve Cardillo with notice of the hearing concerning the dispute on three 
separate occasions by way of certified mail sent to Cardillo’s former New Jersey address.  
Because Cardillo no longer resided at that address, the certified mailings were returned to 
the Committee as undeliverable.  The dispute proceeded before the Committee without 
Cardillo’s participation, and the Committee ultimately entered a decision adverse to 
Cardillo.  
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 When Cardillo became aware of the Committee’s decision, she sent an email to 
the Office of Attorney Ethics (“OAE”), which oversees the Committee, seeking to reopen 
the fee arbitration proceeding on the basis that she did not receive proper notice.  The 
gravamen of Cardillo’s argument is that the notice was insufficient because, pursuant to 
N.J.R. 1:20-7(h), notice of Committee hearings must be provided either “by personal 
service, or by certified mail (return receipt requested) and regular mail . . . .” Cardillo 
argues that the Committee only sent certified letters, which are unable to be forwarded 
and were therefore returned as undeliverable.  Because she had her regular mail 
forwarded to a friend in New Jersey, Cardillo alleges she would have been notified of the 
Committee proceedings had the notices also been sent by way of regular mail.   
Defendant Charles Centinaro, the acting Director of the OAE, denied Cardillo’s 
request in a response email.  Cardillo then appealed both the Committee’s decision and 
the OAE’s denial to the New Jersey Disciplinary Review Board (“DRB”).  Cardillo 
alleged in her appeal to the DRB that she had not received proper notice of the 
proceeding before the Committee, that the Committee knew she did not receive proper 
notice, and that the proceeding should therefore be reopened.   
The DRB determined that notice was proper, dismissed her appeal, and affirmed 
the Committee’s decision.  Cardillo next sought reversal of the DRB’s decision by filing 
a notice and petition for review with the New Jersey Supreme Court.  Defendant Mark 
Neary, the Clerk of the New Jersey Supreme Court, informed Plaintiff by letter that her 
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Petition would not be considered because decisions rendered by the DRB are final and 
not appealable to the New Jersey Supreme Court.1   
Cardillo then filed suit in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a 
deprivation of her procedural due process rights predicated upon the insufficiency of the 
notice.  Cardillo moved for summary judgment, and Defendants moved to dismiss.  The 
District Court administratively terminated these motions by letter and, sua sponte, 
directed the parties to brief the question of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over 
Cardillo’s claims.   
The District Court subsequently concluded that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and dismissed Cardillo’s amended 
complaint.  In finding as much, the court stated that:  
[Cardillo’s] fundamental argument remains the same[:] the 
letter-only manner of service selected by the Committee was 
deficient in that it resulted in her deprivation of her right to 
participate in the fee arbitration hearing.  In other words, the 
harm that [Cardillo] claims in this Court, deprivation of her 
alleged due process right to adequate notice under the United 
States Constitution, is coextensive with the basis of her appeal 
to the DRB, and her attempted petition to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court.   
 
(Appellee Appx. 23–24).  Cardillo timely appealed.  
                                              
1 Pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 1:20A, a fee arbitration decision rendered by the 
Committee is final and binding upon the parties, with no right to appeal the merits of the 
decision and a very limited right to appeal procedural defects in the proceedings.  Rule 
1:20A-3 permits Committee decisions to be appealed to the DRB where “the 
[Committee] failed substantially to comply with the procedural requirements of [N.J.R. 
1:20A], or there was substantial procedural unfairness that led to an unjust result. . . .”  
N.J.R. 1:20A-3(c)(2).  Decisions rendered by the DRB are final and not appealable to the 
New Jersey Supreme Court.  See N.J.R. 1:20-16(d). 
5 
 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review 
“where the District Court dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”  Gould Elecs. 
Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).  We “may 
affirm the District Court’s judgment on any basis supported by the record.”  Murray v. 
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted).  
III. 
 The sole issue before this Court on appeal is whether the District Court properly 
applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  On this issue, Cardillo argues that her procedural 
due process claim was never properly before the DRB or the New Jersey Supreme Court.  
[Pet. R. Br.  At 6].  As such, she asserts that reliance upon Rooker-Feldman is 
inappropriate because she has raised a discrete federal claim.   
 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine strips federal courts of jurisdiction over 
controversies “that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments.”  Williams v. 
BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 315 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Great W. Mining & 
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010)).  Federal district 
courts have “no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial 
proceedings.”  Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482.  However, the Supreme Court has held that the 
applicability of the doctrine is “narrow” and “is confined to cases of the kind from which 
the doctrine acquired its name:  cases brought by state-court losers complaining of 
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before district court proceedings 
6 
 
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”  Exxon 
Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).  
We note as an initial matter that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only applies to state 
judicial proceedings and not to administrative or legislative proceedings.  Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 342 F.3d 242, 257 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476.  The threshold question, therefore, is whether the New Jersey 
fee arbitration proceeding is judicial or administrative.  The New Jersey Supreme Court 
established the fee arbitration system pursuant to that Court’s constitutional power to 
regulate the practice of law and the discipline of practitioners.  Guralnick v. Supreme 
Court of N.J., 747 F.Supp. 1109, 1111 (1990) aff’d 961 F.2d 209 (3d Cir. 1992).  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court appoints members of both the Committee and the DRB.  
N.J.R. 1:20A-1 and 1:20-15.  As such, we agree with the District Court’s determination 
that, as “arms and agents” of the New Jersey Supreme Court that have been delegated 
portions of that Court’s constitutional powers, adjudicative proceedings before the 
Committee and the DRB are properly considered judicial, as opposed to administrative, 
proceedings.  (Appellee Appx. 24 n.5 (citing Application of LiVolsi, 85 N.J. 576, 597 
n.22 (1981))).     
In determining whether a proceeding is properly characterized as judicial in 
nature, the Supreme Court has held that “[a] judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and 
enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already 
to exist.  That is its purpose and end.”  Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 226 
(1908).  “The proper characterization of an agency’s actions depends not upon the 
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character of the body, but upon the character of the proceeding. . . .”  New Orleans Pub. 
Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 371 (1989) (internal quotation and 
bracketing omitted).  Fee arbitration proceedings before the Committee contain many of 
the hallmarks of judicial proceedings, including:  initial and responsive pleadings; the 
right to a hearing with the opportunity for all parties to be heard; the ability to compel the 
attendance of witnesses sworn under oath; the production of documents; the use of 
subpoenas; interpleader; and the ability to appeal.  See N.J.R. 1:20A-3.  The Committee 
collects facts and issues a declaration based upon the current law.  Id.  Here both the 
nature of the body, which possesses the delegated authority of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, and the nature of the proceedings lead to the conclusion that the fee arbitration 
system establishes a judicial proceeding.   
 The next question is whether the requirements of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are 
satisfied here.  Interpreting the holding in Exxon Mobile, we have concluded that four 
requirements must be met in order for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to preclude federal 
court jurisdiction: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains 
of injuries caused by the state court [judgment]; (3) [that judgment was] rendered before 
the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and 
reject the state [judgment].”  Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 166 (citation omitted).  “The 
second and fourth requirements are the key to determining whether a federal suit presents 
an independent, non-barred claim.”  Id.   
We find that all four requirements are present here and that the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine precludes federal jurisdiction.  First, Cardillo lost in state court when the 
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Committee rendered an adverse decision and the DRB denied her appeal.  Second, the 
injury of which Cardillo complains––namely the putative deprivation of her procedural 
due process right to adequate notice––resulted from the DRB’s determination that the 
Committee’s notice was proper.  Third, there is no dispute that Cardillo instituted her 
federal action after she received notice from the New Jersey Supreme Court that her 
appeal of the DRB decision would not be considered.  Finally, we need not look any 
further than the prayer for relief in Cardillo’s Amended Complaint (Appellee Appx. 4 at ¶ 
6) or her request to this Court in her briefing (Pet. R. Br. 7) to determine that she seeks 
our review and rejection of the New Jersey judgment.   
 Cardillo’s argument that her constitutional claim was not properly before the DRB 
or the New Jersey Supreme Court, and therefore beyond the ambit of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, is without merit.  As the District Court concluded, the procedural 
defect of which Cardillo complains––the insufficiency of the notice––is co-extensive 
with her constitutional claim, and she has already availed herself of the opportunity to 
raise these claims before the DRB.  [Appellee Appx. 25-26].  We agree with the District 
Court’s conclusion that, given the identical nature of the claims raised before the OAE 
and DRB with those asserted here, any proceeding in federal court would “not so much 
offer an opportunity to challenge the adequacy of the notice before the Committee, but 
rather [serve] to challenge the decision of the DRB that notice was adequate.” (Appellee 
Appx.  26). This type of review of final state court determinations is exactly what 
Rooker-Feldman seeks to preclude.  
IV. 
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 Because all four prongs of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are satisfied, we will  
affirm the holding of the District Court.    
